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09/20/1998 • 4 views

U.S. Launches Retaliatory Strikes After Bombings at Kenyan and Tanzanian Embassies

Aerial view of a sparse, arid Afghan camp area with tents and low structures, smoke rising in the distance after a strike; no identifiable faces.

After near-simultaneous bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam on August 7, 1998, the United States launched airstrikes on September 20, 1998, targeting suspected terrorist training camps and facilities in Afghanistan believed linked to the attacks.


On August 7, 1998, truck bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring thousands. U.S. investigators attributed the attacks to al-Qaida, then led by Osama bin Laden, and identified operatives and training sites in Afghanistan and Sudan as linked to the network. After weeks of intelligence collection and international consultations, the Clinton administration authorized a limited military response.

On September 20, 1998, U.S. forces carried out cruise-missile strikes—primarily using Tomahawk missiles—against sites in Afghanistan and Sudan. Targets in Afghanistan included camps and facilities in the Khost region and other locations used for training militants and housing al-Qaida operatives. In Sudan, the intended target was the al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, which U.S. officials said had ties to chemical weapons and links to al-Qaida; Sudanese authorities and some international observers disputed that assessment.

The strikes in Afghanistan were presented by U.S. officials as punitive and aimed at degrading terrorist operational capabilities and deterring future attacks on American interests. The campaign reflected the evolving U.S. counterterrorism posture of the late 1990s, emphasizing remote precision strikes against nonstate actors sheltered by weak or hostile regimes.

The Sudan strike was more controversial. The destruction of the al-Shifa facility led to immediate international debate: U.S. officials maintained the plant was involved in producing precursors for nerve agents and had ties to al-Qaida, while Sudanese authorities denied the allegation and pointed to the significant humanitarian consequences, including loss of a major source of medicines. Subsequent investigations and reporting produced differing assessments; some later analyses questioned the solidity of the intelligence used to justify the Sudan strike.

The September 20 strikes did not eliminate al-Qaida or its capability to mount further attacks. The group remained active and continued to plan and execute operations in the years that followed, culminating in the September 11, 2001, attacks. Domestically and internationally, the 1998 strikes prompted debate over the use of stand-alone military force in response to terrorism, the adequacy of intelligence linking targets to terrorist activities, and the balance between retaliation and broader diplomatic or law-enforcement approaches.

In the immediate aftermath, U.S. officials framed the strikes as a necessary assertion of national self-defense and a message to states and nonstate actors providing safe haven to terrorists. Critics argued the action risked civilian casualties, legal ambiguities, and escalation without clear prospects for dismantling terrorist networks. The episode remains a notable early example of the U.S. use of precision long-range strikes against transnational terrorist targets and highlights enduring tensions in counterterrorism policy between military, intelligence, and legal considerations.

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